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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to study the current state and the prospects of ecological collaboration 
activities to protect the Baltic Sea including both the EU and Russia. The researchers, studying the EU 
environmental policy in the Baltic Sea region often ignore Russia since this country has separate 
environmental policy concerning the Baltic Sea area. However, Russia is a member of Helsinki 
Commission (HELCOM) a supranational body which was established forty years ago to safeguard the 
marine environment of the Baltic Sea strengthening interstate cooperation. The main focus is the 
investigation of new patterns of interaction on environmental issues that influence the allocation of 
space and meaning of societal time in the Baltic Sea region. Relying on multi-level governance theory, 
three dimensions of space (natural, national and trans-boundary) and five levels of societal time 
(regional, EU, national, municipal, cross-border) are analyzed. While space is regarded as a politico-
social object, which should be subjected to transformation, the societal time is used to plan required 
environmental changeovers. Both aspects encompass not only area of the EU littoral members in the 
Baltic Sea region but all states of the Baltic Sea catchment area (Belarus, Czech Republic, Russia, 
Slovak Republic and the Ukraine). 
Keywords 
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Introduction* 
The research of change in time and space in the process of protecting and transforming the 
environment of the Baltic Sea is the subject matter of this article. Although the study of the Baltic Sea 
environmental cooperation consists of big amount of the work, a spatial dimension of the current 
transformations in this region has received comparatively little attention in literature (Van Deveer 
2004; Metzger & Schmitt 2012). Relying on the multi-level governance approach (Marks 1993; Bache 
& Flinders 2004), I analyze the re-evaluation of the meaning of time required to complete all the 
European Union (EU) and the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) requirements improving the space of 
the Baltic Sea. This approach facilitates the examination of EU environmental policy through the 
adoption of obligatory framework directives, which have strengthened transnational interests and 
diversified the stakeholders involved in the protection and conservation of the Baltic Sea (Kern 2011). 
A traditional top-down decision making system has been complemented by horizontal network 
governance, in which the responsibility of actors corresponds to a certain level - supranational, 
regional, national, and local "as the result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional re-
allocation" (Marks 1993:392). These levels create a framework for analyzing both space and time. 
Since the Baltic Sea space has been reexamined and received a new dimension after mapping the “hot 
spots” in the 1990s, i.e. extensively heavy-polluted water areas a part of which is located at the 
borderland, I am going to turn main focus from the subjects of governance of various actors to the 
objects of governance of space and time, which are the crucial factors of planning improvement of the 
Baltic Sea ecology.  
Structurally the study will look like that. The first part dissects the importance of the national state 
and multi-level governance for environmental time and space planning. The second part examines 
societal space of the Baltic Sea on three levels that constitute common and heterogeneous socio-
political area simultaneously. The third section deals with the same thing, but with respect to the 
societal time of the Baltic Sea during the planned activities aiming at improving the ecological status 
of the Baltic Sea.  
The National State, Multi-level Governance and the Environmental Concern in the 
Baltic Sea Region 
The national governments have been playing a substantial and key role of preservation and exploiting 
natural resources since they are regarded as “highly visible, legitimised and competent territorial 
actors and protectors”. (Jänicke, 2002:5; also Gross, 1985). A nation state also defines its own 
territorial borders. As Hassner pointed out, in this case the borders are treated in a conservative sense 
as a main instrument in the establishment of reliable relations between the states. Through the borders 
such as lines, walls, fortresses, etc. a state defines its territories independence and the identity of the 
people who are living within these borders (Hassner, 2002). The international postwar confrontation 
around Inner German and German-Polish borders, on the one hand, and the process of the delimitation 
of continental shelf between the Baltic Sea states, on the other hand, reflected such understanding of 
the borders overtly (Gray, 2003; Franckx, 1996). In spite of the fact that after the end of the Second 
World War the Baltic Sea became the arena of the acute rivalry of the Eastern Bloc and Western 
Allies, this region tended to the international cooperation, especially in the sphere of the 
environmental policy (Hägerhäll, 1980). 
The Baltic Sea region was one of the first places in the world in which environmental issues 
became acute items of the international agenda. The pollution of the Baltic Sea has become the lead 
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object in the nascent field of international environmental politics in the aftermath of the 1972 UN 
Stockholm conference (Jong, 2006:30). Eutrophication was recognized as the main threat to the Baltic 
Sea, which means the addition of artificial or non-artificial substances, such as nitrates and 
phosphates, through fertilizers or sewage to the fresh water system. Besides this issue the Baltic Sea 
suffers from overfishing, invasion of alien species, and the presence of organic toxins in the waters 
(Håkanson & Bryhn, 2008:1). The first multilateral Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area was signed in 1974. All the states from the Baltic area, 
East Germany, Denmark, Poland, the USSR, Finland, West Germany, and Sweden ratified the 
agreement. The executive body of the Helsinki Convention became Helsinki Commission 
(HELCOM). It assumed the role of an environmental policy-maker, monitoring and evaluating the 
condition of the Baltic Sea (Brusendorff, 2007)
1
.  
Although the Convention could be regarded as a significant achievement in the regional 
cooperation between the Baltic Sea states, the agreement did not regulate the environmental policies of 
the states within their national borders. In the context of the Cold War and mutual distrust, 
opportunities for cooperation were limited (Räsänen & Laakonen 2008). Therefore, the Helsinki 
Convention of 1974 could be treated as a "conservative" agreement that did not intend to create a 
common space, but introduced some protective measures. The internal waters were out of reach of the 
Convention because of sovereignty considerations. On the whole, the problem was not solved since 
these waters constitute the pollution load to the Baltic Sea together with the national part of the 
catchment area. (Darst, 2001:57-58). 
By the mid-1980s the international and national levels seemed to be the most important for 
implementation of the planned transformations of the Baltic Sea environment. Since the territorial 
scope determined by the Convention was restricted to the open seas, the littoral states were 
independently trying to reduce emissions within their national borders. At a regional level HELCOM 
played a notable role as an expert body organizing the monitoring of pollution of the Baltic Sea as well 
as publishing recommendations on reducing harmful emissions. But neither time scaling, nor spatial 
dimension of the Baltic Sea environmental issues was still possible to measure at a transnational level. 
The state determined time frame and territorial coverage of environmental protection alterations only 
within its borders. While Western capitalist states did manage to achieve a perceptible reduction of 
discharges in their own catchment areas, the Socialistic countries failed to fulfill their own deadlines 
and directions by the end of the 1980s. For example, a rigid and heavily centralized vertical power in 
Russia was not able to ensure the effective execution of the decrees, which led to further deterioration 
of inland waters (see Roginko 1996:20-24). 
The favorable political climate of the second half of the 1980s and the Soviet Union's openness to a 
dialogue with Western countries intensified the cooperation between the Baltic Sea countries. 
HELCOM Ministerial Declaration of 1988, which aimed at reduction of hazardous substances to 50% 
for a 10-year period, induced the states to act at a national level more actively (Selin & VanDeveer 
2004:154). Three years later these goals were questioned because of the economic collapse of the 
USSR. 
The dramatic change on the political map of Europe in the early 1990s led to an increase in the 
number of the Baltic Sea states from seven to nine. West Germany merged with East Germany in 
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1990. The following year due to the collapse of the USSR Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
became independent states. The Iron Curtain fell, the old barriers (ideological, economic, etc.) 
between the East and the West were broken. Moreover, the former Socialist republics of the Baltic Sea 
region - Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - proclaimed openly the course of joining the main 
European institutions - the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
The main consequence of the geopolitical alterations in the Baltic Sea region was the development of 
cross-border cooperation (Kern & Lȍffelsend, 2004). On the background of the EU enlargement 
process, this interaction went quickly, involving both developed and developing countries. During that 
period an unfavorable attitude to the border appeared to be unambiguous, since it was perceived as an 
obstacle to the development of the Baltic Sea region, inherited as the legacy of the “cold war” 
(Tassinari et al., 2003:17). On the other hand, the border was understood as a starting point of 
overcoming inequalities and discrepancies between the West and the East (Aalto, 2006:14-27). 
In the last decade of the twentieth century the necessity of overcoming gaps between countries with 
developed market economy relying on stable democracy and Post-Soviet republics in transition 
compelled affluent capitalist countries and the EU to launch a cooperation, on completely different 
scale and quality, in the Baltic Sea region. It has had three important consequences. First of all, the 
former Socialistic countries became the participants of more open international cooperation in 
environmental issues. Facing significant challenges in transition from planned to market economies, 
the Eastern European countries were forced to accept the material and infrastructural assistance from 
their richer neighbors to solve their environmental problems.  
Transnational subsidization has become the key mechanism to promote the environmental policy 
in the developing countries. An extensive cooperation infrastructure was encouraged by the developed 
countries (Darst, 2001:5-6). 
Secondly, by 2005 the Baltic Sea had almost turned into the internal sea of the EU, except for the 
territorial waters belonging to Russia. This meant that all EU countries should have been in agreement 
with the EU legislation in the field of the environmental protection. The EU Urban Wastewater (1991) 
and the EU Water Framework (2000) Directives are the obligatory documents, which set rigid 
parameters for waste water treatment plants. In addition, the Baltic Sea came within the purview of the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive in 2008. This document is governing the European seas 
exploitation. Finally, the EU adopted a special Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region in 2009 (EU 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region) (Pihlajamäki & Tynkkynen, 2011:42-43). 
Thirdly, the extension of cooperation increased the number of actors involved in the solution of 
environmental issues. The growing role of NGOs and municipalities was associated with a new 
blueprint proposed by the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992, where Agenda 21 was signed by 179 governments. More importantly, Agenda 21 advanced 
municipal and cross-border interaction and cooperation, since it launched municipal and regional 
strategies to solve local problems (Lundqvist 2004a: 32-33). The formation of the Council of the 
Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which introduced “Baltic 21” strategy in 1996, reflected the fundamental 
change in the sphere of international relations. Over and above traditional state-centered relations, 
other levels of reciprocal actions have been involved in the process of the environmental 
transformation of the Baltic Sea region. They vary from supranational institutions to transnational 
policy networks (Kern & Lȍffelsend 2008:120). 
The enlargement of the European Union and the development of multi-level governance have 
changed the role of the nation state radically. In literature scholars have been discussing after-effects 
of these transformations. While Pierre describes governance as stressing "erosion of traditional bases 
of political power", Jänicke assigns the state the part of a “local hero” in the sphere of the 
environmental protection. (Pierre, 2000:1; Jänicke, 2002:5; Eckerberg & Joas 2004:406; Kern & 
Lȍffelsend, 2004:459). The common environmental policy of the EU through the adoption of binding 
framework directives has led to the strengthening of subnational interests and diversification of the 
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stakeholders involved in the process of protection and conservation of the Baltic Sea (VanDeveer 
2011: 44-45).  
However, multi-level governance raises the question of borders definition in the case of the 
environmental management (Kern, 2011:29-30). Since water, air, animals, fish, etc. do not recognize 
the state and maritime boundaries, the issue of multi-level governance stumbles upon the problem of 
effectiveness, participation and legitimacy as Lundqvist pointed out. Spatial dimension of the problem 
has crucial importance since in case of being clearly outlined areas the natural borders could help to 
delineate "terms of authority and responsibility, as well as terms of democratic accountability, both 
downward and upward" and "defines the circle of relevant principal stakeholders and participants on 
the grounds of their relation to the ecologically defined level of governance" (Lundqvist, 2004b: 414).  
The environmental multi-level governance tries to set clear parameters for the spatial 
transformations of the Baltic Sea area, and to target a deadline to be implemented in spite of uncertain 
and contested process of decision making (Pihlajamäki & Tynnkynen, 2011:27-32). The concrete 
embodiment of spatial renewal in the region can be traced in various ambitious undertakings such as 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, or VASAB long-term strategic document of the Baltic 
Sea region (1994) aiming at integrated and coherent development of coastal areas. As a matter of fact, 
the various actors of the region offer an extensive agenda of making common environmental area of 
the Baltic Sea which ties together both natural and national space by means of developing 
transnational and cross-border cooperation. Moreover, the environmental concern has caused the 
necessity to distinguish three dimensions of space natural, national and trans-boundary which 
constitute three patterns of interaction – conflict, competition and cooperation. These categories reflect 
the main processes of the governance over the space of the Baltic Sea. 
Natural Space: an Uncertain Area between Cooperation and Conflict 
In the epoch of spatial turn it seems that the state space as a “sovereign” entity with its own laws and 
within its strict boundaries does not exist anymore. The global environmental issues emphasized an 
importance of natural space, which overstepped the national borders (Warf & Arias, 2009:6). The 
space has been recognized as “constant motion”. In other words, “there is no static and stabilized 
space” (Thrift, 2006:141). The variety and diversity of the spaces just stress an idea of the space 
contextuality. It appears through mapping practice. Mapping has been an important part of the 
“imagined community”; it defines the scope of national or regional identity making (Anderson, 1991). 
In the 1970s when the environmental problems of the Baltic Sea were recognized by the scientific 
community, mapping of Sea pursued at least two purposes: the dissemination of scientific knowledge 
of the Baltic Sea natural condition and the establishment of the international research agenda on the 
protection of the open sea. The Report of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES) in 1974 not only raised the awareness of the deterioration of the Baltic Sea ecosystem but it 
urgently appealed to making further study of the natural space in its integrity. (De Jong, 2006:82-83). 
In its turn HELCOM also played a notable role in the re-defining of the natural borders of the Baltic 
Sea. In spite of the Cold war era when the state borders and coastal waters were closed from 
international surveillance, HELCOM concentrated its efforts on developing non-binding 
recommendations which were to help to decrease a negative influence of industry and agriculture in 
the Baltic Sea catchment area. Nevertheless, under these conditions the scientists and experts achieved 
considerable progress in the study of natural conditions of the Baltic Sea (HELCOM, 1986:143-144). 
The main consequences of this ambitious research were the identification of the sources of pollution 
and understanding that the problem could not be solved by separate states. A crucial turn towards 
more coordinated actions combining scientific prescriptions and proactive decision-making happened 
after the Chernobyl disaster. In 1988 HELCOM published a report on radioactive substances in the 
Baltic Sea paying special attention to the necessity of enhancing joint efforts to study this issue 
thoroughly (HELCOM, 1989:10). Due to the favorable international atmosphere and willingness of the 
USSR to enlarge cooperation with the West countries this plea met approval of the Soviet government. 
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Finally, the Soviet part of the Gulf of Finland became accessible for international crew of marine 
scientists (Darst 2001:64).  
From the beginning of the 1990s common environmental space of the Baltic Sea began to be 
formed. The process was initiated in 1990, when Ministerial Conference in Ronneby, Sweden adopted 
the Baltic Sea Declaration. This document spurred the elaboration of the "Joint Comprehensive 
Environmental Action Programme" (JCP) in order to restore the Baltic Sea “to a sound ecological 
balance" (HELCOM, 1993:I-1). After the collapse of the USSR its four former Soviet republics - 
Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Estonia - joined HELCOM. In 1992 HELCOM prepared a new 
Convention. The new agreement contains a practical implementation mechanism to improve the Baltic 
Sea ecological status. Due to this programme HELCOM outlines "hot spots" on the map - the heavily-
polluted areas of the Baltic Sea - which should be removed in the future (HELCOM, 1993:VI-IX). The 
programme allowed all the Baltic Sea states to become the participants of more open international 
cooperation on environmental issues. There were originally 132 hot spots, 98 of which were located in 
the former Socialistic countries (HELCOM, 1993: VI-IX; 5-5). Table 1 shows that the national states 
and sub-regions of the Baltic Sea are used as markers to denote the level of eutrophication of territorial 
water of this or that country. Drawing "hot spots" on the map, HELCOM redesigned both political 
borders and natural sub-regions of the Baltic Sea. An international concern of the pollution control 
broadens the target territory from the Baltic Sea itself to the more extensive catchment area. It includes 
not only all littoral states but also four countries – Belarus, Ukraine, Czech Republic and Slovak 
Republic which share common rivers with the Baltic Sea states. Hence environmental hot spots also 
designate the catchment area of these states since the Nemunas (Belarus), the Vistula (Belarus, 
Ukraine) and the Oder-Odra rivers (the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic) flow directly into 
the Baltic Sea (see table 3). The HELCOM list of hot spots demonstrates full interdependence of 
natural parts and maritime borders of the Baltic Sea (HELCOM, 1993:5-28). 
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Table 1. Environmental Hot Spots in the Baltic Sea Catchment Area 
Sub-regions Countries of the catchment 
area related to Sub-regions 
Numbers of hot Spots 
according to the 
HELCOM list 
Bothnian Bay Finland, Sweden 1-2 
Bothnian Sea, Archipelago Sea 
and Åland Sea 
Finland, Sweden 3-10 
Gulf of Finland Estonia, Finland, Russia 11-30 
Norhtern Baltic Proper Sweden, Estonia 130 
Western Gotland Basin Sweden  
Gulf of Riga Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Russia 
31-48 
Eastern Gotland Basin Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Sweden, 
Russia, Ukraine 
49-96 
Bornholm Basin (including 
Arkona Basin) 
Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Poland, Sweden 
97-118, 131-132 
The Sound Sweden, Denmark 123-125 
Belt Sea Germany, Sweden 119-122 
The Kattegat Denmark, Sweden 126-129 
Source: HELCOM, 1993. Vol. 48. Chapter 3, 5. 
The ecological space of the Baltic Sea revealed potential not only for mutual cooperation, but also for 
acute international environment and energy conflict because of laying the Baltic Sea gas pipeline 
“Nord Stream” (Whist, 2008). All Baltic countries and Poland regarded this joint project of Russia and 
Germany as a threat to Geopolitical expansion going from Moscow. It was not an idea of the new 
pipeline but the route itself that caused this vigorous resistance. The main arguments of the project 
opponents were environmental concerns. In order to challenge the contracting parties to make the 
pipeline policy, the politicians based their opinions on the data of a scientific community. The 
negative impact on bird and marine life, the potential threat to the sea bed where a lot of toxic 
materials including chemical weapons dumped into the Sea in the past decades has been accumulated 
appeared to be main reasons why Nord Stream pipeline should be disbanded (Karm, 2008: 108-109).  
The struggle of the opponents of expert opinions of scientists helped to recognize close 
interdependence of both state and sub-region borders of the Baltic Sea. The EU States in the region 
began to perceive their maritime borders as a natural part of the Baltic Sea. Under the influence of 
Nord Stream discord a new agreement on International Sea Surveillance Cooperation of the Baltic Sea 
(SUCBAS) was signed in March 2009. SUCBAS unites eight countries - Estonia, Denmark, Latvia, 
Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Finland, and Sweden to share surveillance of the Baltic Sea information 
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and to ensure maritime safety and conduct border control in accordance with international agreements 
(http://www.sucbas.org/). 
National Space: A Contest over Maritime Borders 
Despite the end of the Cold War all states in the Baltic region were not going to refuse the intension of 
strengthening their borders as an instrument of consolidating national identity. This aspect was 
especially evident in the relationships between Russia and Baltic States, former Soviet republics. In 
the 1990s in Latvia and Estonia some people and politicians discussed the possibility to restore the old 
borders which had been before 1940 when two districts of Pskov oblast belonged to these states 
(Aalto, 2003:23). On the contrary, Russia worried about NATO enlargements in the former Socialistic 
republics and heavily criticized the initiative of location of anti-ballistic missile system in the Czech 
Republic and Poland (Mankoff, 2011:25). In this sense the “conservative” period of strengthening the 
borders continued even after the dissolution of the USSR (Hassner, 2002). 
Apart from international disagreements on foreign policy the essential aspect of demarcation of the 
national borders is the delimitation of continental shelf on the Baltic Sea. According to the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982/1994 the sea is divided into several zones. As for 
the Baltic Sea, three zones are of importance: a) internal waters on the landward side of the baseline; 
b) the territorial sea extending up to 12 sea miles seawards from the baseline; c) the exclusive 
economic zone extending up to 200 sea miles (Submariner compendium, 2012: 45). All these zones of 
the Sea are subjects of the negotiations between the states. 
Signing of such agreements is obviously a vast field for competition and conflict between the 
opposite sides. However, the Baltic Sea region has demonstrated the ability of successful negotiating 
between the countries on delimitation of the Baltic Sea maritime borders (Franckx, 2001). This 
process was already launched in the Cold war era. During the period of the late 1950s – the 1960s five 
two-sided agreements between the USSR, Poland, East Germany and Finland (this state didn’t belong 
to the Soviet bloc) were made. They concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf on the Baltic 
Sea. Soviet-Polish (1958, 1966), Soviet-Finnish (1965, 1967) and East German-Polish (1968) 
agreements established comprehensive continental shelf boundaries in the East and in the South of the 
Baltic Sea. Neue Ostpolitik and Détente expanded this process towards the agreements between the 
countries of Eastern and Western blocs as well as neutral states (Franckx, 1996). All these agreements 
continued the general policy of delimitation on the Baltic Sea in order to secure national maritime 
borders. But this process did not go easily. West Germany and Denmark were not able to resolve the 
contradictions in fishery in the border area (Jaenicke, 1983); the Protocol Note of FRG and GDR 
agreement delimitated only a small part of the bay, while the remaining part was not settled. Later, in 
the 1980s due to Perestroika and political changes in Eastern Europe, the Baltic Sea states became 
more involved in the negotiations on the delimitation of the continental shelf. A number of treaties 
between 1985 and 1991 were so great that they might be compared to the ones made for the whole 
post-war period (Franckx, 1996). After the collapse of the USSR and the formation of new states the 
agenda was to implement maritime boundary delimitation both within the former Soviet Baltic space 
and with the EU neighbors. The EU countries and Baltic States put this process into effect more 
intensively and much faster. It became obvious that the EU policy of creating a common space 
encouraged opposite sides to achieve mutual consent more actively and quickly (Franckx, 2001). On 
the contrary, the negotiations between Russia and the Baltic States (especially Russia and Estonia) 
could be compared to the period of "cold war" when the negotiations between the Baltic Sea countries 
stretched for a long time. The non-recognition maritime boundary agreements concluded by the USSR 
caused acute controversies between former Soviet republics preventing them from the signing the 
border treaties (Franckx, 2012:440-441). 
The divided maritime space between the national states has been the subject of the regulatory 
framework at different international levels. Besides UN and HELCOM Conventions the Baltic Sea are 
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under the jurisdiction of the EU (see Table 2). A set of various EU directives binds the Baltic Sea 
region in the united space. The environmental concern has transformed separated spots of pollution 
into a coherent and functional region. The EU directives on the water protection, especially Water 
Framework Directive, impel to involve its actors and stakeholders - from supranational (the EU, 
HELCOM) to local (District Water Authority in Sweden, the municipalities, etc.) - into interaction 
(Lundqvist, 2004b; Kern & Lȍffelsend, 2008). Water acts as a go-between linking between the 
stakeholders according to spatial distribution of hot spots. This spatial distribution is not equal. On the 
contrary, it forms - using Soja’s notion - hierarchal ordering which establishes administrative 
governance of the environmental space (Figure 1). The EU Water Framework Directive and Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive conform to supranational level heading this hierarchy. Below, at the 
national level, the countries should elaborate and implement detailed River Basin Management Action 
Plans (RBMPs) to coordinate actions of all interested parties and, if needed, to develop trans-boundary 
cooperation (Pihlajamäki & Tynkkynen, 2011:34). To create a sound ecosystem freed from harmful 
influence of the nitrogen and phosphorus the state maritime borders and the catchment area are 
delimited as the biosocial zones which require an intensive trans- and cross-border collaboration.  
 
Figure 1. Hierarchal ordering of water governance in the EU  
Supranational level (EU’s Framework Directives) 
 
 
 
 
 
National level (RBMP) 
 
 
 
 
 
Trans-boundary level (cooperation to implement the Framework Directives and RMBP)  
Table 2. The Baltic Sea Space and the Goals of International Regulatory Framework 
International Conventions and EU Directives 
Natural space National space Trans-boundary space 
The Convention on the Protection 
of the Marine Environment of the 
Baltic Sea (HELCOM), 1974/92 
(Aim: measures for the prevention 
and elimination of pollution of the 
Baltic Sea)  
United Nation Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 1982/94 
(Aim: to define the rights and 
responsibilities of nations in 
their use of the world’s oceans, 
establishing guidelines for 
businesses, the environment, 
and the management of marine 
natural resources) 
EU Urban Wastewater Directive (Aim: 
to protect the environment from the 
adverse effects of urban waste water 
discharges), 1991  
EU Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) (Aim: to protect all waters, 
surface and groundwater; achieving 
“good status” for all waters by 2015), 
2000 
EU Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive (MSFD) (Aim: Good 
Environmental Status of the EU’s 
marine waters by 2020), 2008 
Source: Submariner Compendium, 2012. P. 37. 
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Trans-boundary Space: On the Way from Random Interaction to Systematic Cooperation at Pan-
Baltic Level 
The formation of trans-boundary space has become the result of the development of multi-level 
governance between adjacent states of the EU. International and European regulatory framework of 
environmental policy prompt various stakeholders to discharge aims of the EU directives by means of 
sharing responsibilities and joining efforts (Baldersheim & Stahlberg, 2002:78). In literature the 
scholars have stressed that multi-level governance in the Baltic Sea region is characterized by an 
intensive development of the various forms of network connections beyond the nation state (Kern & 
Lȍffelsend, 2008; VanDeveer, 2011). The transnational networks and intergovernmental cooperation 
are encouraged by the EU as a supranational actor. The EU strategy for Baltic Sea region and the 
framework directives set a spatio-temporal perspective of the environmental policy for numerous 
stakeholders involved in transformation of the regional environment. 
The decisive factor in strengthening cooperation at trans-boundary level has become the EU 
enlargement in the Baltic Sea region in 1995 and 2004 consequently. All littoral states except Russia 
had joined the EU by 2005. A partnership project “Northern Dimension” started in 1997 upon the 
initiative of Finland. The goal of this undertaking was to develop regional cooperation of the countries 
that geographically and politically belonged to the Northern Europe. Since that time the terms 
“Northern” and “Nordic” have reinforced the regional identity of the Baltic Sea interpreting the 
borders as a starting point of cross-border cooperation between adjacent areas (Tassinari et al., 
2003:18-19).  
Ten years later, one of the crucial afterwards of the EU enlargement became the adoption of a new 
strategy of the Baltic Sea Action Plan in November 2007. The main goals of the plan are the issue of 
eutrophication, the invasion of alien species, and the maintenance of biodiversity by means of 
reduction of nutrient discharges into the sea (HELCOM, 2007). The ultimate deletion of hot spots has 
to lead to a partial restoration of the ecosystem of the Baltic Sea and in its turn it may result in the 
formation of common environmental space within the Baltic area (HELCOM, 2009). BSAP together 
with the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region have proved an effective mechanism of solving the 
environmental issues (Kern, 2011; VanDeveer, 2011). However, in the case of the deletion of the 
Baltic Sea hot spots the state remains an important if not a crucial actor (Kern & Lȍffelsend, 
2008:135). 
Separate state efforts to remove "hot spots” are not enough to create a completely new and good 
ecological space in the Baltic Sea (Kern 2011). In cross-border maritime territories the problem can be 
solved only by joint efforts (table 3). For example, the lack of up-to-date waste water treatment plant 
in Kaliningrad area is an urgent problem not only for the local authorities, but also for their neighbors 
- Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden. The purification of the Gulf of Riga cannot be done by 
Latvia only. This problem can not be solved without the participation of Estonia, either. Cross-border 
projects such as “Project on Reduction of the Eutrophication of the Baltic Sea Today” (PRESTO) and 
“Emajoe-Pskov Water Management Project” (ELRI-13) rely on transnational subsidization, or loans 
from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (see also other examples Roginko, 
1996: 37-38; Darst, 2001: 81-86). Thus, the purpose of the spatial division of hot spots is the 
elimination of environmental inequality among various sub-divisions of the Baltic Sea, and the 
creation of common and safe practices of the exploitation of the Baltic Sea catchment area. 
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Table 3. The Trans-Border Cooperation in Environmental Hot Spots Deletion in the Baltic Sea 
Catchment Area 
Countries Geographical location of hot 
spot according to HELCOM 
list 
Type pollution Project 
Estonia/Russia Gulf of Finland, Narva River 
Basin  
(# 25) 
Treatment of municipal 
wastewater 
ELRI-13 
Estonia/Latvia  Gulf of Riga (# 36-37) Agricultural runoff 
programme 
(Estonia)/Environmental 
management programme 
(Latvia) 
Estonia-Latvia 
Programme, 2007-
2013 
Finland/Germany/Latvi
a  
/Lithuania/Belarus 
Daugava River Basin (# 46-
47)/Nemunas River Basin (# 
51,61)/ Vistula River Basin (# 
93)  
Treatment of municipal and 
industrial wastewater 
PRESTO 
Lithuania/Russia Kursiu Lagoon (# 66) Environmental management 
programme 
Action for the 
Reinforcement of 
the Transitional 
Waters’ 
Environmental 
Integrity 
(ARTWEI) 
Russia/Poland Vistula Lagoon (# 73) Environmental management 
programme 
ARTWEI 
Czech Republic/Poland Odra River – Upper Basin (# 
111) 
Salt control Czech Republic –
Poland 
Programme, 2007-
2013 
Poland/Germany Odra Lagoon (# 113) Environmental management 
programme 
ARTWEI 
Denmark/Sweden The Sound (# 123-125) Agricultural runoff 
programme/Treatment of 
municipal wastewater 
ARTWEI 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperate/cooperation/index_en.cfm; http://www.territorialcooperation.eu/frontpage/show/7494 
Mutual interest in trans-border interaction arises from regional inequality that differentiates the 
capacity of meeting EU Directives requirements. The Vision and Strategies around the Baltic 
(VASAB) Long Term Perspective (2009) specifies three main divisions of the Baltic Sea Region:  
 The east-west divide – the former iron curtain – now reflects differences in prosperity and 
innovation performance. 
 The north-south divide results from different climate conditions and is reflected in population 
density and related density in infrastructure. 
 The urban-rural divide reflects different developmental perspectives and the importance of 
economies of agglomeration, resulting in differences in unemployment structure; age structure 
and migration patterns (Submarine Compendium 2012: 29-31). 
The first divide has been an incentive for the development of trans-border cooperation over the hot 
spot deletion in the Baltic Sea while the other two respond to the socio-economic purposes and needs. 
The hierarchy in this case means the matter of the institutional development, financing, and the index 
of environmental concern (Roginko, 1996; Hermanson, 2008). The Western countries demonstrate 
their leading role in the process of the environmental transformation of the Baltic Sea while the former 
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Socialistic states have been regarded as a driven party requiring additional investments into out-of-
date infrastructure from more affluent neighbors. 
The east-west divide also exposes its difference through the extent of environmental activism and 
the political institutionalization of environmental concerns between the well-developed Western 
countries and the developing East European states (Kern, Joas and Jahn, 2008:216-217). This 
discrepancy is the main issue of the sustainable development of the Baltic Sea. The former Soviet 
countries have had far more modest resources to solve their ecological problems within the national 
borders of the Baltic Sea. It is not so much a question of the differences in standards of national wealth 
as of an insufficient development of human resources, organizational strengthening and the quality of 
the institutional reforms in East European countries (Van Deveer & Dabelko, 2001). During the 1990s, 
when the environmental movements in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland were just beginning to 
be politically active, influential environmental organizations in Germany and Nordic countries already 
existed (Hermanson, 2008; Kontio & Kuitto, 2008). In order to equalize the existing discrepancy the 
EU has been promoting the transnational cooperation projects “Baltic Sea Region Programme, 2007-
2013” through the European Neighbourhood Policy and Partnership Instrument. The project 
“PartiSEApate” ties together the natural and national space, contributing to coherent spatial 
development while “one space has to be planned at the pan-Baltic level” (The Baltic Sea Region 
Programme, 2012:34). Three of four priorities of the Baltic Sea Region Programme aim at creating 
common societal space of the Baltic Sea where a spatial organization produces the patterns of the 
sustainable development of the safe environment (table 4). However, the absence of Russia (though 
Belarus participates in PRESTO) in Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007-2013 and obvious narrowness 
of EST-LAT-RUS cross-border projects (http://www.estlatrus.eu/eng/projects/) demonstrate confined 
opportunities of EU and Russia to form common environmental space in the Baltic Sea region. 
  
Dmitry Nechiporuk 
12 
Table 4. Environmental Projects of the Baltic Sea Region Programme, 2010-2014 
Project Participating countries and 
duration 
Goal Priority 
BSR InnoShip (Baltic 
Sea cooperation for 
reducing ship and port 
emissions through 
knowledge- and 
innovation-based 
competitiveness)  
Denmark/Estonia/Finland/ 
Germany/Latvia/Lithuania/ 
Norway/Poland/Sweden 
 
 
 
 
October 2010 – September 2013 
To become a model region 
for clean shipping; to 
reduce the use and impact 
of hazardous substances 
#2 (Internal and 
external 
accessibility) 
CleanShip (Clean 
Baltic Sea Shipping) 
Denmark/Estonia/Finland/ 
Germany/Latvia/Lithuania/ 
Norway/Poland/Sweden 
 
September 2010-September 2013 
To become a model region 
for clean shipping; to 
reduce the use and impact 
of hazardous substances 
#2 (Internal and 
external 
accessibility) 
BERAS (Baltic 
Ecological Recycling 
Agriculture and Society 
Implementation) 
Belarus/Denmark/Estonia/ 
Finland/Germany/Latvia/ 
Lithuania/Poland/Sweden 
 
September 2010-August 2013 
To reduce nutrient inputs 
to the sea to acceptable 
levels 
#3 (Baltic Sea as a 
common resource) 
Baltic Deal (Putting 
best agricultural 
practices into work) 
Denmark/Estonia/Finland/ 
Latvia/Lithuania/Poland/ 
Sweden 
 
September 2010-August 2013 
To reduce nutrient inputs 
to the sea to acceptable 
levels 
#3 (Baltic Sea as a 
common resource) 
SUBMARINER 
(Sustainable Uses of 
Baltic Marine 
Resources) 
Denmark/Estonia/Finland/ 
Germany/Latvia/ 
Lithuania/Poland/Sweden 
 
September 2010-August 2013 
To reduce nutrient inputs 
to the sea to acceptable 
levels; to preserve 
biodiversity 
#3 (Baltic Sea as a 
common resource) 
BALTADAPT (Baltic 
Sea Region Climate 
Change Adaptation 
Strategy) 
Denmark/Estonia/Finland/ 
Germany/Latvia/ 
Lithuania/Sweden 
 
September 2010-August 2013 
To mitigate and adapt to 
climate change 
#3 (Baltic Sea as a 
common resource) 
PRESTO (Project on 
reduction of the 
eutrophication of the 
Baltic Sea today) 
Belarus/Finland/Germany/ 
Latvia/Lithuania 
 
September 2011-March 2014 
To reduce nutrient inputs 
to the sea to acceptable 
levels 
#3 (Baltic Sea as a 
common resource) 
PartiSEApate (Multi-
level Governance in 
Maritime Spatial 
Planning throughout the 
Baltic Sea Region) 
Germany/Latvia/ 
Lithuania/Poland/Sweden 
 
 
 
 
June 2012 – December 2014 
To encourage the use of 
Maritime Spatial Planning 
in all Member States 
around the Baltic Sea and 
develop a common 
approach for cross-border 
cooperation 
#4 (Attractive and 
competitive cities 
and regions) 
Source: Baltic Sea Region Programme, 2007-2013. http://eu.baltic.net/Approved_projects.4589.html 
Societal Time and the Environmental Governance of the Baltic Sea 
Societal time is a key resource for the planned transformation of the Baltic Sea environment. It differs 
from calendar time. The latter is an indication when an event occurs. According to Kellerman, societal 
time is "time of society"; it cannot be reduced to "the aggregate time of individuals within any given 
societal context" (Kellerman, 1989:101). The main difference between societal time and individual 
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time is the scale of perspective. In contrast to the individual time, societal time looks always into the 
future. Societal time indicates – if it is possible at all - the date by which one needs to solve the 
problem, as well as delocalizes the area where a disaster can happen (see Beck, 2006:333-334). In the 
case of the Baltic Sea region delocalization manifests itself in recognition of negative effects of 
pollution on all the countries of the Baltic Sea catchment area and their neighbors. The examples of 
these effects may be unsafe ship traffic or invasion of alien species. Societal time needs to transform 
nature by finite deadline. For example, a hot spot is socially constructed reality in a certain space - the 
Baltic Sea - and it has clearly defined a life cycle, 1992-2021 according to the BSAP and HELCOM 
reports. The calendar time framework is common for all countries, although they have different 
potentials to meet the requirements of this plan. The main distinction is the capacity of actors trying to 
turn to account the advantages of societal time to solve the same problem at the same span of time. 
Societal time on environmental issues presumes a well-defined plan of actions usually shared by 
several relevant actors. Such a blueprint for all stakeholders has been Baltic Sea Action Plan.  
Societal time used to fulfill the designed targets can be exposed at several levels. The targets form a 
“progressive boundary”, on which the division is associated with the perception and use of societal 
time (Hassner, 2002). Again, like societal space of the Baltic Sea region, societal time constitutes 
hierarchal ordering. It arranges societal time according to the main tiers of multi-level governance - 
supranational, national, regional and local (Hooghe & Marks, 2003:234). In the case of the governing 
of the Baltic Sea they appear to be HELCOM, EU, national, local, and cross-border ones. Societal 
time levels are built in vertical multi-level governance although all these levels could be regarded as “a 
horizontal shift of responsibilities from governmental actors/authorities towards non-governmental 
actors” (Eckerberg & Joas, 2004:407). Table 5 shows that the rigid schedule of the goals 
implementation stresses a leading role of the EU and HELCOM that designate the ultimate plans and 
deadlines to national and municipal authorities. All these deadlines are obligatory for the EU members 
except for ultimate date – 2021 which is proposed by HELCOM as a desirable goal to improve the 
conditions of the Baltic Sea. Nevertheless, 2021 as the final target is perceived by all littoral states as 
eventual since they should fulfill the aims of the EU Framework Directives between 2015 and 2020. 
So far as these goals coincide with HELCOM’s vision of the sound status of the Baltic Sea by 2021, 
the deadlines set the consequent schedule to carry out all required measures. Hence, at the cross-
border level the municipalities collaborate with the variety of the stakeholders to fulfill the goals of the 
EU Framework Directives and implement HELCOM recommendations at the borderland areas (see 
also tables 3 and 4). 
Table 5. Societal Timeline of the Environmental Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region 
Level Framework Document Deadline 
Regional (HELCOM) Baltic Sea Action Plan 2021 
EU EU Strategy for the BSR as all-embracing 
document  
EU Water Framework Directive (WFD)                      
EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
(MSFD) 
 
 
2015 
 
2020 
National National Implementation Plan (NIP) 2016 (I) 2020 (II) 
Municipal NIP as well as WFD 2015 
Cross-border Baltic Sea Region Programme 2020 
Regional level. The regional level, or HELCOM level is bringing all stakeholders taking part in the 
environmental rescue of the Baltic Sea together. HELCOM ties all littoral countries of the Baltic Sea 
region at this level. They form common regional identity striving to improve ecological conditions of 
the Baltic Sea. HELCOM defines the parameters of the interactions between all states of the region. 
The general frameworks for cooperation at the regional level are determined by the Baltic Sea Action 
Plan (BSAP) which was adopted by all the Baltic Sea states in 2007 including Russia. According to 
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this plan, the Baltic Sea should be discharged from the influence of the anthropogenic eutrophication 
by 2021 (http://www.helcom.fi/BSAP/en_GB/intro/). Thus, this level is the core of the successful 
actions at all other levels which are responsible for the implementation of BSAP.  
The EU level. At EU level politicians and experts define the scope of societal time of the 
environmental policy in the Baltic Sea region. Therefore, it has an impact on all other levels. Since the 
last enlargement in 2004 the EU has taken all responsibilities for the environmental protection of the 
Baltic Sea, including eutrophication. The environmental policy of the EU set constraints of societal 
time to the Baltic region, as all the countries will have had to achieve high environmental standards in 
the areas of water and marine protection, air pollution control, and agricultural policy by 2015-2020.  
Thus, the EU environmental policy has been the foundation for the Baltic Sea Action Plan. The 
latter is not binding for the littoral states, but the EU Framework Directives are. They compel the EU 
to pursue a policy of close cooperation with non-EU states, since it is necessary for the EU to 
implement the targets of the Water Framework Directives. The only possible solution is in the 
development of trans-border projects with Belarus, Russia and Ukraine aiming at drastic reduction of 
the nutrient load in the Baltic Sea catchment area. The goal of the various programs under the aegis of 
the EU Neighbourhood Policy and Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership is to involve the 
non-EU countries (Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia) into EU environmental policy, which aims to achieve 
good status of the marine waters by 2020. But the success of such cooperation does not only depend 
on a generous funding. In order to synchronize differences in the use of societal time in the sphere of 
the environmental policy, it is necessary to adopt the general plan for all the countries of the Baltic Sea 
catchment area. This agenda is EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region which was approved by the 
European Council in 2009. 
National level. In order to achieve a common goal by the specified time the Baltic Sea Action Plan 
impels all littoral states to elaborate the National Implementation Programmes by 2010. The ultimate 
HELCOM objective will target in 2020 when all the Baltic Sea countries and especially the states in 
transition decrease the emission of the hazardous substances 
(http://www.helcom.fi/Recommendations/en_GB/rec19_5/?u4.highlight=2020). The more a country 
implements HELCOM recommendations, the less societal time it has if compared to the countries that 
have fulfilled the necessary regulations. 
As for the countries with the developed economy - Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland - the 
main problem for them is not so much the embodiment of innovations, reducing harmful emissions 
into the sea, but making consensus decisions. Theoretically, the latter should be suitable both for the 
government bodies and NGOs, on the one hand, and the economic interests of the business, on the 
other hand. Tight requirements designed by HELCOM, are beneficial for the environment, whilst in 
some cases they worsen competitiveness of some sectors of economy, especially, agriculture 
(Pihlajamäki & Tynkkynen, 2011:93,99,105). 
Municipal level. All these difficulties in coordinating the national plans are directly related to their 
implementation at the municipal level. Here the perception of societal time differs from that at the two 
previous levels. Since every national implementation plan has a deadline to which all the planned 
activities should be completed, the municipalities are supposed to be the first to meet the requirements 
of national programs of reducing harmful emissions into the sea. In spite of a great variety of these 
plans, according to both its contents and structure, 2015 is the definitive year for all EU states at the 
municipal level (Pihlajamäki & Tynkkynen, 2011:26, 58, 76). According to that schedule all countries 
are defined to propose the implementation of the main goals on the water protection by 2015.  
Consequently, the municipalities interested in the implementation of HELCOM recommendations 
may suffer from more rigid restrictions in the use of societal time. This means less time-lag for the 
implementation of HELCOM requirements. In other words, the municipalities should fulfill all 
measures of the national plan earlier than by 2020. The constraints of societal time also imply other 
significant limitations: economic, infrastructural, political, etc. For example, the Russian political 
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system is characterized by the huge dependence of the municipalities on the Federal Government. The 
regions’ financial dependency and the local authorities’ inability to use target investments effectively 
raise doubts as to the capacity of Russia to use societal time at the municipal level properly 
(VanDeveer & Dabelko, 2001; Pihlajamäki & Tynkkynen, 2011:54). 
Cross-border level. This level implies at least two tiers of cooperation. First of all, a cross-border 
level means coordinated interaction between two or more different states. In the 1990s Agenda 21 
pushed forward the harmonized measures on the protection of both the catchment area and the Baltic 
Sea waters. The examples of such cooperation nowadays are shown above in table 3. The main urgent 
issue complicating the efficacy of cross-border reciprocal ventures is the potential difference in the 
capacity of the states to achieve the same results within the same time framework. This problem is 
especially exposed at the municipal tier and means inequality in ability of the neighboring 
municipalities (at least one of them) to use societal time skillfully to transform the common 
environment. Indeed, such cooperation transcends national borders, but it is often powerless before the 
economic and political obstacles that prevent them from successful interaction. An example of such 
inefficient collaboration is the project ARTWEI (see table 3). Because of different administrative and 
legal systems in Poland, Lithuania and Russia, the local municipalities could achieve the mutual 
cooperation and success only in some limited area such as GIS mapping. At the same time a bulk of 
trans-border issues have been remaining unresolved, i.e., the common management of the lagoons 
(http://www.balticlagoons.net/artwei/). As a result, societal time has not only "positive constraints", 
forcing the stakeholders to carry out all the necessary recommendations, but also negative ones, 
limiting their full accomplishment. 
Conclusions 
The environmental concern of the Baltic Sea has revealed the necessity of multi-level governance 
when responsibility is shared between the various actors - NGOs, municipalities, supranational bodies 
like the EU, HELCOM, or international finance institutions like NEFCO, EBRD. The governance of 
shared watersheds is a challenge to adjacent national states and local municipalities. More 
economically developed and environmentally advanced countries could not isolate themselves from 
their neighbors polluting adjoining territories even more. Pollution from a neighbour state reaches the 
other shore anyway not only by water, but by air, animal, food, etc. The negative impact of nature 
degradation of the Baltic Sea region economy is also an important reason to develop trans-boundary 
and cross-border cooperation. Joint efforts for solution of the environmental problems help to enhance 
the region’s competitiveness at the global scale. 
The perception of hot spots as a threat to sustainable development of the Baltic Sea has formed a 
new view on the environmental space as a dynamic reality in time. Indeed, hot spots construct a 
specific timing-spacing homology when time is used “as a means to the pattering of space" 
(Kellerman, 1989:28). Space is regarded to be a politico-social object, which should be subjected to 
transformation. In practice, this is a partial conversion, ideally it should be total, because each element 
of planning (agriculture, energy, maritime traffic, extensive urban development, etc.) may have a 
negative impact on the environment. New treatment practices with the environment of the Baltic Sea 
region - agricultural practices, recycling practices, reducing emissions from shipping, etc. - have been 
leading to more intensive spatio-temporal specification of the environmental policy at all levels: the 
EU, regional, national, municipal, and cross-border. Removal of hot spots is a complex project and, 
therefore, requires interaction of many different stakeholders. This has led to the development of 
multi-level governance especially at cross-border level when the stakeholders share the responsibility 
to fill a discrepancy gap between the neighboring areas. As a result, new patterns of spatial governance 
in the Baltic Sea region have started their formation inside the framework of multi-level governance 
since the 1990s. Transnationalization and Europeanization have become the main trends of spatial 
planning in the EU states, while Russia has continued relying on the former Soviet practices to 
improve the ecological conditions of the national part of the Baltic Sea catchment area. 
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